Abstract. We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the …rm relies on implicit incentive contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual accountability, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and assumes full responsibility for its outcome; and (ii) team accountability, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. The key trade-o¤ is that team accountability mitigates multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cut-o¤ rule: …rms with high reputation concerns opt for team whereas …rms with low reputation concerns opt for individual accountability. Team accountability is more likely the more acute is the multitasking problem. However, the cut-o¤ rule need not hold if the …rm combines implicit incentives with explicit pay-per-performance contracts.
Introduction
Firms frequently give work assignments to a group of employees (or "teams") and hold them jointly accountable for the outcome of the assignment. In fact, …rms often adopt such a strategy even when it is technologically feasible to assign each worker to a particular job, and hold him solely accountable for his own performance (Bartol and Hagmann, 1992; Shaw and Schneier, 1995) . Such a practice may seem counterintuitive because team performance can obscure individual contributions and blunt incentives. While there is a vast literature in agency theory that studies the optimal incentive provisions in teams, Corts (2007) is perhaps the …rst to explore how, in a multitasking environment, team accountability may arise endogenously when individual accountability is still a technologically feasible option. Corts argues that team accountability may optimally balance the trade-o¤ between mitigating the multitasking problem and exposing the workers to a higher performance volatility.
This article contributes to the recent literature on endogenous job design by drawing out the implications for team accountability in the presence of implicit contracts-an informal promise of the …rm to reward its worker(s) that is sustained through the threat of future retaliation of the worker(s) should the …rm renege on its promise. 1 Indeed, it is not hard to …nd real life examples where the …rms o¤er implicit incentives in an environment where both multitasking and job design also play a crucial role. Consider the mutual fund industry. Managing a mutual fund may require a fund manager to exert e¤ort to …nd new investment opportunities as well as to gather information about the risks associated with such investments. Even though both risks and returns signi…cantly a¤ect the overall pro…tability of the …rm, a fund manager may be tempted to undertake high return investments without paying su¢ cient attention to the underlying risks. 2 Traditionally each fund was individually managed by an assigned manager. However, there is a recent trend to move towards "comanaged"and/or "team managed"funds where a group of employees are jointly responsible for the performance of a set of funds (see, e.g., Prather and Middleton, 2000; Chen, et al., 2004; and Massa, 2008) . 3 Implicit contracts, in the form of bonus payments, are ubiquitous in this industry.
As is the case with the mutual fund industry, there are two natural job designs: (i) individual accountability, where each agent is assigned to a particular job. He performs all of the tasks associated with the job, and is solely responsible for the outcome of job he has been assigned to. (ii) Team accountability, where a group of agents share the responsibility for a job. Each agent performs a subset of tasks associated with the job and all agents are jointly accountable for the job outcome.
In this article, we argue that while team accountability may mitigate the multitasking problem, it may make implicit contracts more di¢ cult to sustain. The key trade-o¤ associated with the team accountability is as follow: The primary bene…t of the team accountability is that it enriches the set of performance signals available to the …rm and helps mitigating the multitasking problem. Because multiple agents contribute to di¤erent tasks associated with a job, di¤erent agents can be paid di¤erently based on the job outcome. That is, even though all agents are compensated based on the outcome of the job in which they have contributed to, the …rm can vary the power of the bonus incentives o¤ered to each of the team members in order to align an agent's incentive with the task he has been assigned to. Such manipulation of incentives (and hence, e¤ort) across tasks alleviates the multitasking problem. In contrast, under individual accountability, the …rm must induce an agent to work on all tasks associated with a job by o¤ering a single bonus payment that is based on the outcome of the job in which the agent has been assigned to. This leaves no room for any manipulation of incentives (and e¤ort) across multiple tasks associated with the job. Consequently, the multitasking problem prevails.
Team accountability, however, also in ‡icts a cost on the …rm: It weakens the …rm's ability to sustain implicit incentives. Under team accountability, the …rm must commit to each of the team members a separate bonus payment for each of the tasks the agent has been assigned to. So, the …rm must credibly commit to a larger bonus pool (i.e., the sum of all bonus amounts promised to each team members for each task he has been assigned to) to elicit e¤ort in all tasks. But unless the …rm has signi…cantly high reputation concerns, it may not be able to make such a credible commitment. In contrast, under individual accountability, the …rm only needs to credibly promise a bonus payment to the agent responsible for each job, and it motivates the agent to exert e¤ort in all tasks associated with that job. Thus, even by committing to a small bonus pool, the …rm can ensure that the agent will exert some e¤ort in all tasks, and the total e¤ort provision, aggregated across all tasks, might be sizeable. In other words, under individual accountability, the …rm can o¤er stronger implicit incentives even when it has limited reputation concerns. 4 The aforementioned bene…t of team accountability has been discussed by several authors (Dewatriport, et al., 2000; Corts, 2007) . The novel part of our analysis is to highlight the cost of team accountability in terms of weaker implicit incentives, and to draw out the implications of the trade-o¤ between mitigating multitasking problem and weaker implicit incentives on the …rm's job design decisions. 5 We consider a stylized model where an in…nitely lived …rm hires two in…nitely lived agents. In each period, the two agents exert e¤ort to perform two jobs (say, managing two funds). Both jobs involve two tasks each (i.e., there are four tasks in total). The e¤ort exerted in each of the four tasks cannot be observed by the …rm, which gives rise to a moral hazard problem. However, each of the two jobs yields an observable performance measure. The …rm can o¤er incentives by tying an agent's compensation to the observed performance in the job(s) he has been assigned to. We further assume that the outcome of both the jobs are non-veri…able. Thus, the …rm can only o¤er an implicit contract (i.e., bonus payment) to provide incentives for the two jobs.
The e¤ort exerted in all four tasks has the same marginal bene…t to the …rm. But the e¤ort spent on each of the two tasks related to any particular job a¤ects the observed job performance di¤erently. This gives rise to a multitasking problem. If the …rm o¤ers an incentive tied to the observed job performance, the agent will exert more e¤ort on the task that has the higher marginal impact on the observed job performance and neglect the other task. At the beginning of the game, the …rm chooses between two alternative job designs: individual accountability and team accountability.
In the basic model we assume away any substitutability or complementarity across efforts in di¤erent tasks. This speci…cation rules out any externalities originating form the interdependency of e¤orts, which may potentially impact the trade-o¤ between mitigating multitasking problem and weaker implicit incentives. In such a setting, we characterize the optimal job design as a function of the …rm's discount factor that parameterizes its reputation concerns.
We show that the optimal job design follows a cut-o¤ rule-team accountability is strictly optimal only if the …rm's discount factor is su¢ ciently high. The intuition behind this result is simple, but subtle. Recall that while team accountability allows the …rm to overcome the multitasking problem, it requires the …rm to credibly commit to a larger bonus pool in order to elicit e¤orts in all tasks. If the …rm's discount factor ( ) is su¢ ciently high, the threat of future punishment is signi…cantly large for the …rm, which, in turn, allows the …rm to credibly promise to a high level of bonus payments. Consequently, team accountability becomes optimal. However, for low , the …rm lacks credibility to o¤er large bonus payments. In such a setting, the …rm is better o¤ by resorting to individual accountability. Under individual accountability, even a small bonus payment gives sharper incentives because it elicits e¤ort in all tasks associated with a particular job. The sharper incentives outweighs the ine¢ ciencies originating from the multitasking problem. 4 This e¤ect is in sharp contrast with the credibility of promise discussed in the models of multilateral implicit contracts (e.g., Levin, 2002) . In these models implicit contracts are easier to sustain when promises are multilateral rather than bilateral. We will further elaborate on this issue in Section 3. 5 We do not claim that the aforementioned trade-o¤ is the only trade o¤ the …rms face while choosing the optimal job design. There can be several other bene…ts of team accountability (e.g., facilitating mutual cooperation) as well as other costs (e.g., exposure to larger performance volatility). However, we abstract away from these other costs and bene…ts to stay focused on the trade-o¤ between multitasking and implicit incentives.
Given this basic intuition on how job design may interact with the implicit incentive provisions, we consider a more general setting where the workers'performances in a subset of jobs are indeed veri…able. In such an environment the …rm may opt to provide incentives to its workers though a combination of explicit and implicit incentives. It may o¤er explicit pay-per-performance contracts to agents assigned to the jobs where contractible performance measures are available, and promise implicit contracts to the others.
To …x ideas, consider the case of the commercial insurance industry. The insurers rely on the agents (brokers) to perform two key jobs: (i) search for (commercial) clients who are willing to buy insurance coverage (i.e., search job), and (ii) elicit information about the clients'risk and coverage requirement to ensure that the insurer's o¤ered coverage matches the clients' needs (i.e., match job). 6 The performance of an agent on the search job has a contractible measure-the amount of business he brings to the insurer-and compensated through an explicitly contracted commission rate. The performance in the match job is, however, relatively hard to verify. Often, the agents are compensated for the match job through an implicitly promised bonus payment, or "contingency fee." 7 Both search and match jobs may involve multitasking problems. E¤ective search may require active solicitation of new business from existing clients as well as advertising the insurer's products to a broader cliental. Similarly, e¤ective matching may require that the agent not only to advice the client on the appropriate coverage, but also to elicit accurate information about the risks borne by the clients. 8 The scenario described above can be readily accommodated in our basic model. We can simply reinterpret the two jobs as the "search" and the "match" job, where the agent(s) assigned to the search job is compensated by an explicit pay-per-performance contract and the agent(s) assigned to the match job continue(s) to receive bonus incentives. However, a new e¤ect originates in the presence of the explicit contract: team accountability makes implicit incentives more fragile by enhancing the …rm's punishment payo¤. Following a breakdown of the implicit contract, the …rm may only rely on the explicit contract for motivating agents on the punishment path. That is, the …rm's punishment payo¤ is simply the pro…t it earns from the search job (which is compensated by an explicit contract). The pro…ts from the search job is higher under team accountability as it mitigates the multitasking problem. Thus, the …rm's punishment payo¤ of the …rm is also higher under team accountability. In other words, the punishment threats are weaker under team accountability, which, in turn, increases the …rm's temptation to cheat on its bonus promises.
This new e¤ect invalidates the cut-o¤ rule discussed above. Instead, we …nd that the optimal job design must be one of the following: (i) Only the …rms with very high or very low opt for team, while the …rms with intermediate opt for individual accountability.
(ii) Team accountability is optimal for all . The former is the case when the extent of the multitasking problem is low, while the latter is the case when the multitasking problem is severe. 6 Commercial insurance coverage can often be a complex product, and it may be di¢ cult for the client to assess his exact needs and the best suitable coverage. An important role of the agents is o¤er 'risk analysis,' i.e., to infer the type and degree of risk borne by the client, and advice her on the appropriate coverage. 7 The success in the match job can be measured by observing how a particular client's account has performed in a given time period. One may expect that if the agents were successful in eliciting the information on the level of risk borne by the client, the insurer would tailor its o¤ered coverage appropriately, and would set the premium rate accordingly, to ensure that the account would be a pro…table one. Even though this measure is observable, it is often not veri…able. Insurance claims may take several years to settle. The insurer can manipulate reported performance of the account in a given …nancial year by using discretion on when and how to enter the claim record in its books (Wilder, 2002) . 8 "Misselling"of products is indeed a major concern in the insurance, and, in general, in the …nancial sector (see Indrest and Ottavianni, 2008).
The intuition behind this result is similar to the case of the cut-o¤ result discussed above, particularly when is not too small. For high the …rm can o¤er strong bonus incentives even under team accountability. Thus, team becomes optimal because it alleviates the multitasking problem. For moderate , the feasible bonus payments are low, and bonus incentives elicit more e¤ort under individual accountability, which may outweigh the ine¢ ciencies of multitasking. But what drives the optimality of teams for low ? For su¢ ciently small, the …rm has little reputation concerns, and hence, the implicit incentives are infeasible under both types of job designs. The …rm's pro…t under team accountability is higher because the explicit incentive can elicit more search e¤ort under team setting by mitigating the multitasking problem. However, if the multitasking problem is su¢ ciently large, then even for a moderate , the stronger implicit incentives under individual accountability need not be enough to compensate the associated multitasking problem. In this case, team accountability remains optimal for all values of .
The main results of the article also yield interesting comparative statics predictions by interlinking the key parameters to the …rm's job design decision. For example, the cuto¤ result discussed above indicates that when only implicit incentives are available, team accountability becomes more likely when the …rm's reputation concerns increases. As we will elaborate later, this result also implies that team accountability is more likely to be the optimal job design when the extent of the multitasking problem is severe. This …nding, however, is quite intuitive because the key bene…t of team accountability that we highlight in this model is that of overcoming the multitasking problem. Thus, when the multitasking problem is severe, it favors team accountability over individual accountability.
Related literature: This article relates to two broad strands of literature in agency theoryincentives in team and implicit contracts-and highlights how team accountability may arise endogenously as the optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts.
Both explicit and implicit contracts in teams are well studied in the literature (Holmström, 1982; Itoh, 1991; Che and Yoo, 2003; Rayo, 2007) . However, this literature generally assumes that the team accountability arises exogenously and focuses solely on the incentive issues that may arise in teams. One important exception is Itoh (1991) , who argues that teamwork may indeed orginate endogenously. But his argument relies on the need to foster collaborations among employees rather than on teams'e¤ectiveness to overcome multitasking problem. Our article is perhaps more closely related to Corts (2007) who studies how team accountability may endogenously emerge as the optimal job design in a multitasking environment. Corts shows that in the presence of explicit contracts and risk-averse agents, team accountability might be the optimal job design when the extent of multitasking problem is high and/or the extent of risk aversion among the agents is low. Our article complements Corts' article by highlighting a di¤erent trade-o¤ associated with the team accountability in the presence of implicit incentives. Drawing parallel to Corts, we …nd that team accountability emerges as an optimal job design when the extent of multitasking problem is large and/or the …rm's concerns for future reputation (as represented by its discount factor) is high.
Another article that is closely related to ours is Levin (2002) . Levin discusses the costs and bene…ts of multilateral contracting over bilateral contracting in employment relationships. In a multilateral contracting, similar to team accountability, the …rm makes commitments to a large group of employees whereas under bilateral contracting, similar to individual accountability, the …rm makes commitments to individuals or small groups. There is no multitasking issue in Levin's model, and he highlights the trade-o¤ that while multilateral contracting are di¢ cult to adjust in response to exogenous shocks to the business environment, it facilitates implicit contracts. The latter e¤ect is in sharp contrast with our article where team accountability hinders implicit incentive provisions. We will revisit this issue in Section 3.
Finally, our article is also related to two "sub-branches" of the agency theory literature: (i) multitasking (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991; Dewatripont, et al., 2000; Besanko, et al., 2005) and (ii) interaction between explicit and implicit incentives (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Baker, et al., 1994) . In contrast with our article, the existing literature on multitasking primarily focuses on the explicit incentives. And the literature on the interaction between incentives primarily discusses the characteristics of the optimal contract (that emerges from such interplay between incentives) and is silent about its potential implications on job design in a multitasking environment. An important exception is Schöttner (2008) . Schöttner investigates when to split three tasks between two agents if both explicit and implicit contracts may be feasible. In her model, task-spliting can elicit the …rst best e¤ort level in one of the three tasks, but implicit contracts are sharper under "no-task-splitting." However, these bene…ts and costs of task-spliting originate from very di¤erent reasons (compared to our model)-namely, speci…c restrictions on the agents' cost function and larger punishment threats when tasks are not split. Also, in contrast to our results, Schöttner …nds that tasksplitting can be optimal only when implicit contracts are infeasible.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the basic model and section 3 characterizes the optimal job design. The role of explicit contracts is discussed in section 4. Finally, section 5 discusses the empirical implications and the robustness of our main results and concludes.
The Basic Model
Players. A long-run …rm, F , hires two long-run agents, A and B, to manage two funds. 9 
Stage game
In what follows we will describe the stage game that is played between the …rm and the agents in each period. The stage game is de…ned in terms of its four key ingredients: technology, job design, contracts, and the players' payo¤ s. We elaborate below on each of these four ingredients. 10 Technology. The technology is modelled after the canonical task allocation model of Dewatripont et. al (2000) . There are three central features to this class of models: (i) The …rm only cares about the impact of the agents' e¤ort to its bottom line (de…ned below as V ); however, V is not observed by the agents, (ii) the agents'compensations are based on a set of performance measures (de…ned below as x) that are observable but are distinct from the …rm's bottom line, and (iii) the marginal impact of the agents' e¤orts on V and x are di¤erent, giving rise to a multitasking problem (we will elaborate on this below). 11 The detailed description of the model is as follows.
Suppose F owns two funds, say 1 and 2, where in each period a fund performance can either be good or bad. Let x i 2 f0; 1g be the index for the fund's performance, where x i = 1 if the fund's performance is good and x i = 0 if it is bad (i = 1; 2). We de…ne managing a fund as a "job" (thus there are two jobs in total). Each job consists of two tasks: (i) …nding investment opportunities that yield higher returns, and (ii) assessing the underlying 9 The reference to the mutual fund industry is only to maintain a parallel with the example discussed in the introduction. The model presented here does not purport to be a model of mutual fund but a general model of multitasking with implicit incentives. 10 For the sake of clarity, while describing the stage game we will suppress the time su¢ x t associated with each variable. 11 A similar model is also adopted in Corts (2007) . Another important feature of this modeling approach is that it abstracts away from the issue of e¤ort substitution to highlight how the availability of performance measure for individual tasks (or the lack thereof) shapes the optimal job design in a multitasking environment.
risks associated with such an investment opportunity. We denote tasks 1 and 2 as the tasks required for job 1, and the tasks 3 and 4 are required for job 2. Task j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g requires an e¤ort level of e j 2 [0; 1]. Let the cost of e¤ort in task j be c (e j ) = e 2 j =2. The tasks a¤ect the value, V , that F receives from the two funds, where V (e) = (e 1 + e 2 + e 3 + e 4 ) ; and > 0. The value V is not observable to the agents. One may interpret V as the impact of the agent's e¤ort in various tasks to the bottom line of the …rm's pro…tability. This value accrues directly to the …rm and may not be clearly observed by the rank-and-…le of a hierarchical organization. Furthermore, e¤orts are also unobservable, but each of the two jobs has performance measures, x 1 and x 2 , that are observable. The e¤orts in each of the two jobs determine their performance as follows: (1) Pr (x 1 = 1 j e) = e 1 + e 2 ; Pr (x 2 = 1 j e) = e 3 + e 4 ;
where > 1. While x 1 and x 2 are observable, none of them are veri…able. 12 The parameter measures the extent of multitasking problem. An agent who is compensated on the basis of x 1 (or x 2 ) has incentives to substitute away from e 1 (or e 3 ) and concentrate more on e 2 (or e 4 ), even though all tasks have the same marginal impact on the …rm's value (V ). We assume the following parametric restriction to ensure that the probabilities in equation (1) are well-de…ned (i.e., probabilities lie between 0 and 1) in any equilibrium of this game:
Assumption 1 requires to be small when is large and vice versa. This restriction also simpli…es the …rm's optimization problem by ruling out corner solutions.
An important issue to note about this technology speci…cation is that it rules out all interactions across e¤orts in di¤erent tasks. The costs (c) and value (V ) are additively separable in e¤orts ruling out any substitutability or complementarity across tasks. The assumption of additive separability streamlines the model and improves the exposition of the key trade-o¤ between multitasking and implicit incentives. This trade-o¤ itself is not driven by this assumption, and we will discuss the impact of relaxing this assumption later in Section 5.
Job design. Each agent is responsible for exactly two tasks. The type of allocation of tasks between the two agents is referred to as the job design. The …rm chooses between two alternative job designs: individual accountability and team accountability. The agents have individual accountability when one is assigned to the tasks 1 and 2, and the other is assigned to the tasks 3 and 4: Thus, under individual accountability, one agent is responsible for joband 4, while the other one (i.e., agent B) is assigned to tasks 2 and 3. This is to say that in a team, both agents have responsibility for both jobs. 13 Assumption 2. F decides on the job design at the beginning of the game, and it's decision irreversible.
Once a particular design is chosen, it is prohibitively costly to change it in a future date. This assumption simpli…es the analysis of the …rm's punishment payo¤, and allows us to draw out the implications of the key trade-o¤ between multitasking problem and sustenance of implicit contract more succinctly.
Contracts. Because the performance in both jobs is non-veri…able, the …rm can only o¤er an implicit contract promising (in each period) a bonus payment if the fund performance turns out to be good.
14 So, under individual accountability (where agent A is assigned to job 1, and B is assigned to job 2), a contract o¤ered to agent A (in each period) is a tuple (W A ; A ), where W A is a lump sum wage and A an implicitly contracted bonus payment that is o¤ered only if x 1 = 1. The contract o¤ered to agent B is also of similar form. In contrast, in a team setting, a contract o¤ered to agent k 2 fA; Bg (in each period) is a tuple (W k ; ki ), where W k is a lump sum wage and ki is an implicitly contracted bonus payment that is o¤ered only if x i = 1.
Payoffs. We assume that both the …rm and the two agents are risk neutral. The payo¤ of the …rm is simply the overall value that the …rm receives from the two funds net of its expected wage payments. The payo¤ of an agent is the expected wages he receives net of the cost of e¤ort. The exact expressions for the payo¤s will depend on the job design. Under individual accountability, the …rm's payo¤ in each period is
where the payo¤s of agent A and B are de…ned as
respectively. In contrast, under team accountability, F 's payo¤ is
the payo¤ of the agent A and B who are assigned to the tasks f1 and 4g, and f2 and 3g are
13 To form teams one can also consider grouping tasks {1 and 3} and {2 and 4}. This con…guration yields the same surplus to the …rm as the one discussed here. We assume the grouping {1 and 4} and {2 and 3} to maintain a parallel with the case of individual accountability where each agent is responsible for exactly one " -task" (i.e., tasks 2 or 4).
14 Note that we are implicitly assuming that the agents'compenstion can only depend on the x signals and cannot be conditioned on the overall value V . In fact, the multitasking problem arises because the …rm cannot compensate the agents based on V .
respectively. The outside option of both agents is assumed to be 0.
Repeated game
The repeated game is simply the aforementioned stage game repeated in each period. Both the …rm and the agents discounts the future payo¤ at a common per period rate of 2 [0; 1).
Strategies and Equilibrium. We will focus on pure strategy equilibria due to their analytical tractability. The strategy of F has two components: (i) At the beginning of the game, F decides on the job design, (ii) in each period, depending on the history of the game, F o¤ers a contract to each agent (the form of the contract depends on the choice of the job design, as discussed above). The strategy of an agent is to choose whether to accept F 's contract, and if he accepts, how much e¤ort to exert (in each period) in the tasks he has been assigned to.
We will use Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in trigger strategies as a solution concept. Under individual accountability, if the …rm reneges on an agent, only the agent who has been cheated on reverts back to his static best response. Under team setting, both agents revert back to their static best responses if the …rm reneges on its bonus promises to any of the team members. 15;16 
Optimal Job design
The optimal job design is derived by comparing the …rm's payo¤ under individual and team accountability when the associated incentive contracts are optimally chosen. Therefore, a characterization of the optimal job design requires a characterization of the optimal contracts. But before we do so, we brie ‡y discuss the …rst best solution to the …rm's contracting problem.
The …rst best solution serves as a benchmark for comparing the e¢ cacy of each of the two job designs. The …rst best solution is the one that maximizes the joint surplus between the …rm and the agents. That is, the …rst best e¤ort levels solve max e V (e) P c (e j ), or, equivalently, must satisfy the …rst-order conditions (2) = e j 8j:
Equation (2) suggests that at the …rst best e¤ort in all four tasks should be the same and equal to , the marginal bene…t of e¤ort to the …rm. We now focus on the optimal contracting under individual and team accountability and compare the e¢ ciency of such contracts with the …rst best outcome. The following lemma (a la Levin, 2003) simpli…es the analysis by ensuring that without loss of generality, one can restrict attention to the class of stationary contracts; i.e., we can characterize the optimal contract in the repeated game as a tuple (W A ; W B ; A ; B ) under individual accountability and (W A ; W B ; A1 ; B1 ; A2 ; B2 ) under team setting, where the optimal contract does not 15 In other words, we implicitly assume that under individual accountability, if the …rm reneges on its promise to only one agent, the other agent does not observe the …rm's deviation, and hence, does not trigger the punishment. However, in a team setting it is more intuitive to assume that each agent learns about the …rm's behavior towards other members of the team. Team production requires close collaboration among its members and it is natural to assume that such collaborations would facilitate communication among team members. Thus, if the …rm renege on its promise to one agent, the other agents would learn about the defection and trigger punishment. 16 One can also assume di¤erent speci…cations-e.g., only the cheated agent punishes irrespective of the job design-without any loss of generality. However, we adopt this speci…cation as it is perhaps more natural to assume that the …rm's relation with any of the team members a¤ects the overall moral of the team. Similar assumptions were also used in models of multilateral contracting (see, e.g., Levin, 2002 Based on this observation we characterize below the optimal contracts under di¤erent job designs.
3.1. Individual Accountability. The optimal contract must satisfy three constraints: (i) Individual rationality (IR), i.e., the contract must o¤er both agents rents at least as large as their outside options. (ii) Incentive compatibility (IC), i.e., given the incentives, both agents chooses their e¤orts to maximizes their expected payo¤s. And …nally, (iii) dynamic restriction (DR), i.e., the …rm's promise of bonus payments must be credible. We elaborate on each of these constraint below.
As the outside options of both agents are equal to 0, given any contract (W k ; k ) and a prescribed e¤ort level e, the (IR) constraints for agent A and B are:
Next, consider the (IC) constraint. As we have discussed above, under individual accountability, agent A is responsible for the tasks 1 and 2 (i.e., job 1), and B is responsible for the two tasks 3 and 4 (i.e., job 2). Given the implicitly contracted bonus payments A (o¤ered if x 1 = 1) and B (o¤ered if x 2 = 1), the optimization problems for the two agents are: Thus, for any credible promise of bonus amounts, the agents'e¤ort choice must satisfy the following incentive compatibility conditions:
The (IC) constraints above highlights the multitasking problem. Consider the case of job 1 that is assigned to agent A (the case of job 2 is analogous). Given that both task 1 and 2 are compensated based on the performance in job 1, the e¤ort exerted in these two tasks are linked by the relation e 1 = e 2 = . Because > 1, for any value of the agent will exert more e¤ort in task 2 and less e¤ort in task 1. And there cannot exist any value of that can ensure the …rst best allocation e 1 = e 2 = .
Finally, consider the dynamic restriction (DR) constraint. If the bonus promises are to be credible, the discounted value of the …rm's payo¤ stream from o¤ering such bonus payments (i.e., equilibrium payo¤) must be greater than the discounted value of the payo¤ stream the …rm may earn if it reneges on its promise to one or both agents (i.e., punishment payo¤). Thus, construction of the (DR) constraint requires a careful study of the punishment payo¤ of the …rm.
Clearly, if the …rm reneges on its promise to both agents, both agents revert back to their static best response, and do not exert any e¤ort. Therefore, the …rm earns 0 in the punishment phase. Consequently, we must have the following constraint on s to ensure that reneging on both agents is not a pro…table deviation:
Similarly, one must also ensure that reneging to only one of the two agents is not a pro…table deviation either. This deviation is relevant only when it is sequentially rational for the …rm to continue to maintain its implicit contract with one agent once it reneges its promise to the other (else, the …rm will always renege on both). Let I k , k 2 fA; Bg ; be the payo¤ of the …rm if it reneges on its promise to agent k but continues to maintain its implicit contract with the other agent. That is, I
k is the punishment payo¤ of the …rm when its defects only on agent k. The following constraint ensures that it is never pro…table for the …rm to renege its promise to one agent while maintaining its promise to the other agent:
Note that when the inequality I k = (1 ) l is satis…ed, it is sequentially rational for the …rm to maintain its promise to agent l while breaching its contract with agent k. Hence, the constraint (DR I 2 ) suggests that even if it is sequentially rational for the …rm to maintain its contract with one agent when the contract with other agent breaks down, it is never optimal for the …rm to renege on only one of the two agents while maintain the contract with the other. The optimal contracting problem can now be written as follows: This problem can be simpli…ed as follows by eliminating W k s and e by using the (IR) and (IC) constraints:
s:t:
We can further simplify this problem by using the fact that I ( A ; Now, imposing DR I 1 and DR I 2 is equivalent to imposing that I A = (1 ) B and
A . 17 But the above maximization problem can be further simpli…ed. Note that the additive separability also implies that for any , I ( ; 0) = I (0; ). Consequently, the problem can be separated into two identical maximization problems-one with respect to A and the other with respect to B . This implies that at the optimal, A = B (say), and the …rm's optimal contracting problem can be written as:
: DR I
In order to solve the above program P I we proceed as follows. Note that we can rewrite the DR I constraint as
where r = (1 ) = . The function R I ( ) respresents how credible the …rm is in making the bonus promise, and can be interpreted as the "reputation capital" (or per-period reputational capital) given the implicit incentive . Solving the maximization problem above is equivalent to …nding the highest that satis…es the (DR) constraint. When > 0, R( ) is positive, increasing and concave. Furthermore, R I (0) = 0. If r is too large (i.e., is too low), such that r > R I0 (0); R I ( ) is always below r , and the only value of that satis…es the (DR) is = 0. Otherwise, the optimal is the maximal at which R I ( ) intersects r until the unconstrained argmax value of is obtained (i.e., as long as the …rst best pro…t is not feasible). The optimal as a function of r, say I (r) is given as follows:
(
The optimal pro…t under individual accountability can now be obtained by plugging the value of I (r) in I . This is stated below in Lemma 2 (we omit the proof as the argument has already been discussed above).
Lemma 2. The optimal pro…t under individual accountability is a continuous and monotonically decreasing function in r given as follows: For r su¢ ciently large (i.e., su¢ ciently low), the optimal pro…t is simply equal to the punishment pro…t of the …rm because no implicit incentives are feasible even on the equilibrium path. As r decreases (i.e., for larger values of ) the …rm gains more credibility in promising implicit contracts. The resulting stronger implicit incentive induces to greater e¤ort, and leads to an increase in the …rm's pro…t until the maximal pro…t under individual accountability is achieved. 18 Having characterized the optimal contract and the associated pro…t of the …rm under individual accountability, we next analyze the case of team accountability.
3.2.
Team Accountability. Under team accountability, agent A is responsible for tasks 1 and 4, while B is responsible for the other two (tasks 2 and 3). As in the case with individual accountability, we …rst discuss the (IR), (IC), and (DR) constraints associated with the optimal contracting problem. The (IR) constraints are analogous to the case of individual accountability and are given as follows:
However, the nature of the (IC) and the (DR) constraints is signi…cantly di¤erent compared to the previous case. Consider the (IC) constraint …rst. Given the bonus payments A1 ; B1 (o¤ered if x 1 = 1) and A2 , B2 (o¤ered if x 2 = 1), the optimization problem for the two agents are: Thus, the (IC) constraints that the optimal contract must satisfy are:
In contrast with the case of individual accountability, the (IC) constraints above highlight how team accountability can mitigate the multitasking problem. Consider the case of job 1 where task 1 is performed by agent A and task 2 performed by agent B (the case of job 2 is analogous). Under team accountability the …rm can vary the power of the incentives o¤ered to agent A and B for each of the two tasks associated with job 1. Because two di¤erent agents are performing the two tasks, they can be paid di¤erently for the same performance outcome in job 1 (i.e., A1 need not be equal to B1 ). Thus, the e¤ort exerted in tasks 1 and 18 Observe that the maximal pro…t under individual accountability is less than the pro…t associated with the …rst best because the multitasking problem continues to prevail irrespective of how strong an implicit incentive the …rm can credibly o¤er.
2 are no longer interlinked (as is the case with individual accountability), and for A1 = and B1 = = , the …rst best allocation (e 1 = e 2 = ) can be attained. 19 Finally, consider the dynamic restriction (DR) constraint. Recall that under team accountability, both agents become aware of the …rm's deviation (and hence, triggers punishment) even if the …rm reneges its promise only with one of the two agents. Thus, if the …rm considers a deviation, it will renege on both agents, and the punishment payo¤ of the …rm would be 0. Consequently, the relevant (DR) constraint is
The optimal contracting problem can now be formulated as follows: This problem can further be simpli…ed by virtue of the following observation: because, the agents are ex ante symmetric, and T is concave and additively separable in s, at the optimum, we must have A1 = B2 and B1 = A2 . Using this fact, we can rewrite the …rm's problem as:
The above optimization program P T is similar in spirit to its individual accountability counterpart P I : However three issues are important to note: First, the DR T constraint o¤ers a neat representation of the key trade-o¤ associated with the team accountability. The DR T constraint indicates that compared to the individual accountability, under team accountability the …rm must commit to a larger bonus pool elicit the same e¤ort levels (because a separate bonus payment must be o¤ered for each task). 19 As re ‡ected by the agents'(IC) constraints, we implicitly assume that the agents cannot collude between themselves. This is a natural assumption in our model because we are primarily interested in exploring how the optimal job design is in ‡uenced by the reputation concerns of the …rm's (rather than the agents'). Indeed, one can interpret the in…nitely lived agents as a sequence of short-lived agents with perfect observability of the game's history (i.e., at the beginning of each period, two new agents are hired who leave the environment at the end of the period.). This interpretation makes our model perhaps more realistic as most …rms face a nontrivial rate of turnover in their workforce.
Consequently, team accountability makes implicit contracts di¢ cult to sustain. However, given an aggregate bonus pool (i.e., A1 + B1 ) the …rm can vary the power of incentives o¤ered for the two tasks (i.e., A1 and B1 need not have to be equal to each other) and overcome the multitasking problem. 20 Second, the DR T constraint is in sharp contrast with the dynamic restrictions discussed in the models of multilateral implicit contracts (Levin, 2002) . In Levin's model, the dynamic restriction under multilateral contracts simply requires that the dynamic restriction under bilateral contract must hold at the aggregate level (i.e., summed over all agents). Thus, the multilateral implicit contracts are easier to sustain. A similar e¤ect is also discussed by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) in the context of multimarket contacts. In contrast, in the current setting, DR T is not an aggregate version of DR I (i.e., the (DR) constraint under individual accountability as given in the program P I ).
Third, the solution technique is slightly more complex than the case of individual accountability. This is because of the fact that now the …rm needs to maximize with respect to two bonus amounts, A1 and B1 , instead of one (as is the case in P I ). We solve this problem in two steps. First, for a given value of total bonus payments = A1 + B1 we characterize the optimal individual bonus payments A1 and B1 . Second, given the optimal A1 and B1 as a function of ; we …nd the optimal that the …rm can sustain.
The maximum reputational capital that can be achieved for a given , can be solved from the following program:
A1 + B1 ; A1 0; and B1 0:
As before, R T ( ) denotes the reputational capital that is achievable given total bonus . Using the standard optimization procedures, we …nd the following solutions to A1 and B1 in terms of the total bonus :
The above equation suggests that when the size of the available bonus pool ( ) is small, the …rm should optimally give incentives only for the " -task" (i.e., task 2). However, as the amount of total available bonus increases, the …rm starts o¤ering bonus for both tasks, eventually reaching the …rst best e¤ort levels.
The intuition behind this …nding is as follows: for a dollar of bonus payment (o¤ered if x 1 = 1) the marginal bene…t of e¤ort is higher if the e¤ort is spent on the -task, i.e., task 2 20 One may also ask whether team accountability may involve an additional cost by encouraging free riding.
Observe that in our model, an agent chooses his e¤ort levels to maximize his own payo¤ and ignores its impact on the other agent's payo¤. Therefore, the impact of the free riding e¤ect is already embedded in the …rm's optimization problem through the agents'incentive compatibility constraints. It is important to note that in our model, free riding problem does not restrain the …rm from achieving the …rst best. As shown by Holmsrtom (1982), free riding problem necessarily leads to a loss of e¢ ciency in absence of any "budget breaker" (i.e., under the constraint that the total wage bill for the team must be equal to the total output produced). Indeed, in our model the …rm is the residual claimant and works as the "budget breaker." Therefore, if the …rm can o¤er su¢ ciently strong incentive, there is no loss of surplus due to free riding and the …rst best can be achieved (as we will show below).
(recall that > 1). Thus, as long as the marginal cost of e¤ort is moderate, a dollar promised for task 2 elicits more e¤ort from the agent than a dollar promised for task 1. When the …rm cannot o¤er large bonus payments, the associated e¤ort level is low, and so is the marginal cost of e¤ort. Thus, in such a scenario the …rm is better o¤ by o¤ering the entire sum on task 2: But as a larger sum of bonus is o¤ered, more e¤ort is spent on task 2 and the marginal cost of e¤ort associate with this task increases. Consequently, the marginal return of a dollar of bonus payment (in terms of the increment in e¤ort induced) on task 2 decreases. In such a scenario, the …rm …nds it optimal to split the available bonus pool between the two tasks such that the marginal returns from bonus dollar o¤ered for each task are equal. When the available bonus pool is signi…cantly large, both A1 and B1 can be chosen appropriately so that the …rst best e¤ort levels become available.
Given these solutions, we can explicitly write R T ( ) as follows:
Now the …rm's optimization problem boils down to the problem of …nding the largest value of subject to the (DR) constraint: R T ( ) r . This problem is similar to the one discussed in the case of individual accountability, and analogously, the optimal can be derived as follows: (7) T (r) = 8 > > > < > > > :
where the function K (r) = (1+ ) r(1+ 2 )+
The optimal pro…t under individual accountability can now be obtained by plugging the value of T ki s in T . This is stated below in Lemma 3 (we omit the proof as the argument has already been discussed above).
Lemma 3. The optimal pro…t under team accountability is a continuous and monotonically decreasing function in r given as follows:
where the function K (r) is as given in equation (7).
For r su¢ ciently large (i.e., su¢ ciently small) the …rm has little reputation concern, and hence, cannot credibly commit to any bonus payments. Consequently, it cannot induce any e¤ort and makes zero pro…t. When r decreases (i.e., increases) the …rm can credibly commit to some but a small amount of bonus payment. As discussed in the context of equation (6) above, when the …rm can only commit to a small amount of bonus payments, it o¤ers bonus only for the -tasks (e 2 and e 4 ). As r decreases even further, the …rm …nds it optimal to o¤er bonus for both tasks, and …nally, for r su¢ ciently small the …rst best e¤ort level becomes feasible.
Equipped with the complete characterization of the …rm's pro…t under team and individual accountability, we can now address the issue of the optimal job design.
3.3.
Optimal job design. The optimal job design for a given value of r (and hence, for a given ) is the one that yields the highest pro…t to the …rm. A comparison between the optimal pro…ts under individual and team accountability leads to the following characterization of the optimal job design.
Proposition 1.
There exists a value of r, say r , such that team accountability is strictly optimal if and only if r < r .
The above proposition suggests that the optimal job design follows a cut-o¤ rule: team accountability is optimal only for the …rms with su¢ ciently high reputation concerns, i.e., su¢ ciently high (or, equivalently, su¢ ciently low r). And individual accountability is optimal otherwise. The key idea behind Proposition 1 is shown in Figure 1 below. Figure  1 plots the optimal payo¤ from team T and individual accountability I as a function of the …rm's discount rate represented by r. The optimal payo¤ functions intersect each other at only one point, r , where the payo¤ from team lies above the payo¤ from individual accountability for all r < r . (1 + ) Figure 1 . The maximal pro…ts under team and individual accountability (team is optimal for r < r )
The intuition behind this result is simple. Recall that while team accountability allows the …rm to overcome the multitasking problem, it requires the …rm to credibly commit to a larger bonus pool in order to elicit e¤ort in all tasks. If the …rm's discount factor ( ) is su¢ ciently high, the threat of future punishment is signi…cantly large for the …rm, which, in turn, allows the …rm to credibly promise to a high level of bonus payments. Thus, team accountability becomes optimal. However, for low , the …rm may not have credibility to o¤er high bonus payments. In such a setting, the …rm might be better o¤ by resorting to individual accountability. Under individual accountability, even a small bonus payments may give sharper incentives as it elicits e¤ort in all tasks associated with the particular job. The sharper incentives may outweigh the ine¢ ciencies originating from the multitasking problem.
Proposition 1 highlights how the optimal job design depends on the …rm's reputation concerns, . It also indicates how job design depends on the extent of the multitasking problem, as captured by the parameter : Corollary 1. The threshold r is increasing in :
The corollary above suggests that as the multitasking problem becomes more severe, the set of r for which team accountability is optimal job design expands . In other words, team accountability is more likely to be the optimal job design as increases. This …nding is quite intuitive because the key bene…t of team accountability is that it mitigates the multitasking problem. Thus, the more acute is the multitasking problem, the more likely it is that the …rm will opt for teams.
Interaction between explicit and implicit incentives
The previous section is instructive in drawing out the key trade-o¤ associated with team accountability. But it does so under a simple framework where implicit contracts are the only form of incentives available. However, in many real life scenarios, …rms augment implicit contracted bonus incentives with explicit pay-per-performance contracts. 21 How would the presence of explicit contracts a¤ect the optimal job design? This section discusses this issue.
In order to accommodate for explicit incentives in the our model, one can simply "relabel" job 1 as the veri…able job and job 2 as the non-ver…able job. In other words, we assume that x 1 is a veri…able signal while x 2 continues to be non-veri…able. Let the piece-rates associated with job 1 under individual accountability be b A and under team accountability be b A1 and b B1 . Thus, the …rm now chooses the tuple (W A ; W B ; b A ; B ) under individual accountability, and the tuple (W A ; W B ; b A1 ; b B1 ; A2 ; B2 ) under team accountability.
Observe that for given values of bs and s, the presence of explicit contracts do not change the incentives faced by the agents in any substantive way (compared to the case where all incentives are implicit). It is merely an matter of relabelling s as bs. Thus, it does not a¤ect the (IR) and (IC) constraints. However, the (DR) constraint changes substantially due to two reasons. First, instead of both jobs, only the incentives associated with job 2 is now implicitly contracted up on. Second, and more importantly, the presence of explicit contracts changes the …rm's punishment payo¤. This is due to the fact that the …rm can continue to rely on the explicit incentives to elicit some e¤ort from the agents even on the punishment path (this is issue is similar to the one discussed in Baker et al., 1994) . Therefore, while discussing below the optimal contracts under individual and team accountability, we will primarily focus on the (DR) constraint.
Consider …rst the case of individual accountability. On the punishment path, agent B reverts back to static best response and do not exert any e¤ort, i.e., e 3 = e 4 = 0. Consequently, 21 For example, recall the case of commercial insurance discussed in the introduction. the optimal explicit contract on the punishment path simply solves the following program (after eliminating W s and es using (IR) and (IC)):
The optimal b A thus obtained is b I A = (1 + ) = 1 + 2 , and the optimal punishment payo¤ is:
Now, analogous to the program P I (the optimization problem of the …rm when both jobs are implicitly contracted, as discussed in the previous section) the …rm's optimization problem can be written as (again, after eliminating W s and es using (IC) and (IR)):
It is important to note the following aboutP I : As before,^ I (b A ; B ) is additively separable in b A and B . Thus, …xing , the optimal b; say b A , is independent of and is exactly equal to b I A . In other words, the …rm continues to o¤er the same explicit contract on both the equilibrium and the punishment path. An implication of this observation is thatP I can be rewritten as:
But this program is identical to the program P I except the fact that the objective function in
, is a linear transformation of the objective function in P I . Thus, one readily obtains the following relationship between the pro…ts associated with the optimal contracts in the two scenarios:
The above equation is quite intuitive given the additive separability of the …rm's optimization problem with respect to the incentives o¤ered to each of the two agents. There are only two key di¤erences between the case where both agents face implicit contracts and the case where explicit and implicit incentives are combined: (i) Only one of the two agents face implicit incentives and the strength of implicit incentives is the same across the two cases. Hence, he generates a pro…t of I =2. (ii) The other agent, the one who is responsible for job 1, faces explicit incentive contract which does not change on the punishment path. Hence, he generates a pro…t of^ I . The same logic holds in the case of team accountability. But of course, the punishment payo¤ under team accountability is di¤erent from its individual accountability counterpart. On the punishment path under team accountability both agents exert e¤ort only in response to the explicit incentives. Thus, e 3 = e 4 = 0 as job 2 is compensated only through implicit contracts. For e¤orts associated with job 1, the (IC) constraints for the agents implies that e 1 = b A1 , and e 2 = b B1 . Therefore, analogous to the case of individual accountability, the optimal explicit contract on the punishment path simply solve the following program (after eliminating W s and es using (IR) and (IC)):
The optimal bs thus obtained are b T A1 = , and b T B1 = = , and the optimal punishment payo¤ is:
Now, analogous to equation (10), the equilibrium payo¤ under team accountability, say, T , is given as follows:
Equations (10) and (12) o¤er a simple characterization of the …rm's equilibrium payo¤ under team and individual accountability when explicit contracts are combined with implicit incentives. Using these relationships, the following proposition shows that the optimal job design no longer follows a cut-o¤ rule in the presence of explicit incentives. Proposition 2. If is su¢ ciently large, team accountability is optimal for all values of r. Else, there exist two values of r, say r 1 and r 2 , such that individual accountability is optimal for all r 2 [r 1 ; r 2 ], and team accountability is strictly optimal otherwise.
The intuition behind this result is similar to the cut-o¤ result discussed in proposition 1, particularly when r is not too large. For r su¢ ciently small (i.e., su¢ ciently large), the …rm's reputational capital is su¢ ciently large. Thus, the …rm can o¤er strong implicit incentives even under teams accountability. Consequently, team accountability becomes optimal because it overcomes the multitasking problem. In contrast, for moderate values of r, individual accountability dominates. This is due to the fact that for a moderate r, the …rm has some reputational capital that allows it to o¤er implicit incentives. In such a scenario, the implicit incentives are sharper under individual accountability. This is because the …rm only needs to promise a bonus payment to one of the two agents, and hence, can credibly promise a larger bonus amount than what it can do if it were to promise a bonus payment to each of the two agents (as is the case with team accountability). When the multitasking problem is not too large (i.e., moderate ), this incentive e¤ect outweighs the multitasking problem associated with individual accountability. But what drives the optimality of teams for su¢ ciently large r? For r su¢ ciently large (i.e., su¢ ciently small), the …rm has little reputation concerns, and hence, the implicit incentives are infeasible under both types of job designs. The …rm's pro…t under team accountability is higher because the explicit incentive can elicit more search e¤ort under team setting by mitigating the multitasking problem.
However, if the multitasking problem is su¢ ciently large, then even for a moderate r, the stronger implicit incentives under individual accountability need not be enough to compensate for the associated multitasking problem. In this case, team accountability remains optimal for all values of r. where is small (team is optimal for r < r 1 and r > r 2 )
The following corollary presents a comparative statics with respect to the Corollary 2. Both r 1 and r 2 are increasing in : Moreover, there exists two threshold values of , say and , such that (i) for < , r 2 r 1 (the size of the interval for which individual accountability is optimal) may increase or decrease in ; (ii) for < < , r 2 r 1 decreases in , and (iii) for all > , team accountability is always optimal.
The corollary above suggests that if is not too small to begin with, team accountability becomes more likely to be the optimal job design as the extent of multitasking problem ( ) increases. Indeed, when is su¢ ciently large, individual accountability is never optimal. This result is similar in spirit to corollary 1, but with one caveat: for su¢ ciently low , an increase in the extent of the multitasking problem may favor individual accountability. This happens due to the following reason. An increase in has two e¤ects on the …rm's payo¤: (i) Incentive e¤ ect: It increases the e¤ort level in the -task as the marginal bene…t of task 2 and task 4 increases with . This e¤ect favors both individual and team accountability. 23 However, it is a priori unclear under which job design this e¤ect is more pronounced. (ii) Multitasking e¤ ect: It accentuates the multitasking problem, and, therefore, increases the loss of e¢ ciency due to the misallocation of e¤ort across tasks. This e¤ect works in favor of team accountability. When is su¢ ciently small, the loss of surplus due to multitasking problem is small. Thus, if the underlying parameters are such that the incentive e¤ect is signi…cantly stronger under individual accountability, it may dwarf the multitasking e¤ect. Therefore, an increase in when is su¢ ciently small to begin with, may favor individual accountability.
Discussion and conclusion
The results discussed in the previous sections (propositions 1 and 2) o¤er a sharp characterization of the optimal job design. However, as noted in description of the basic model, these results are derived under a technology speci…cation that rules out any interaction between e¤orts in di¤erent tasks. To what extent are the key results robust to an alternative technology speci…cation that allows interaction between e¤orts? This …nal section begins with a discussion on this issue. It also explores some of the salient empirical implications of the results and ends with a few concluding remarks.
5.1. Substitutability between e¤orts in di¤erent tasks. Many of the multitasking models in the current literature assume that e¤orts in di¤erent tasks are substitutes in the agents' cost functions (e.g., Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) . In these models, substitutability of effort is one of the main sources of the multitasking problem. In contrast, in the model used above the cost of e¤ort is assumed to be additively separable. While such additive separability improves the analytical tractability of the model, it rules out any room for substitutability between e¤orts in di¤erent tasks. However, it turns out that the key insights of our basic model (as discussed in the context of Proposition 1) continue to hold even if one allows for substitutability between e¤orts in the agents'cost function. The purpose of this subsection is to illustrate this point.
In order to introduce substitutability between e¤ort, we insert an interaction term in the agent's cost function. Keeping all other aspects of the model unchanged, we assume that the total cost of e¤ort for agent k 2 fA; Bg when he is assigned to tasks i and j is c (e i ; e j ) = 1 2 e
where 2 (0; 1] is a measure of substitutability between e¤orts in di¤erent tasks. Thus, agent A's total cost of e¤ort under individual accountability (when he is assigned to tasks 1 and 2) is c (e 1 ; e 2 ) = e 2 1 =2 + e 2 2 =2 + e 1 e 2 , and under team accountability (when he is assigned to tasks 1 and 4) is c (e 1 ; e 4 ) = e 2 1 =2 + e 2 4 =2 + e 1 e 4 (similarly for agent B). Note that when = 0, we revert back to the basic model. And at the other extreme, when = 1, the two tasks become perfect substitutes. The following proposition highlights that when the extent of substitutability is not too large, the key insights of the basic model continue to hold. 23 It is straightforward to see this e¤ect from the agents'(IC) constraints. For example, for agent A, under individual accountability, IC I A implies e2 = A and IC T A implies e4 = A2 . Thus, in equilibrium, an increase in increases both e2 and e4. Proposition 3. For > 1= , team accountability is always optimal. Else, there exists a value for r, sayr, such that team accountability is optimal for all r <r, and individual accountability is optimal otherwise.
The proposition above is similar in spirit to Proposition 1 with one important addition: for su¢ ciently large, team accountability is always optimal. The intuition behind this …nding is as follows. Recall that the parameter measures the extent of substitutability between e¤orts in di¤erent tasks in the agents'cost function. Thus, when is high, high e¤ort in one task signi…cantly increases the marginal cost of e¤ort in the other task. This e¤ect makes the multitasking problem more severe. The agent now has stronger incentive to focus on the " -task" (at the expense of the other task) not only because the e¤ort in the -task has higher marginal impact on the performance signal, but also for the fact that high e¤ort in the -task makes the e¤ort in the other task more costly.
In such a scenario, team accountability is even more e¤ective (compared to the case in the basic model) in eliciting higher e¤orts in both tasks. As discussed before, team accountability helps the …rm to overcome the multitasking problem emanating from the fact that the e¤orts in the two tasks has di¤erent marginal impacts on the performance signal (modelled through the parameter ). In addition, by varying the incentives for e¤ort in the two tasks, team accountability can also o¤set the e¤ort substitution towards the " -task" emanating from the substitutability of e¤ort in the agents'cost function (modelled through the parameter ). For example, the …rm can leave the incentives for the " -task" unchanged, but increase the incentive for the other task ("non--task") in order to compensate the agent for the higher marginal cost of e¤ort in the "non--task" that stems from the high e¤ort in the " -task." This e¤ect makes team accountability more desirable when e¤orts are strong substitutes in the agents'cost function. This observation follows directly from Proposition 3. As > 1; when = 1, the condition > 1= is trivially satis…ed, which ensures optimality of team accountability irrespective of the …rm's reputation concerns (we omit the proof in the appendix, as it is already discussed above).
5.2. Empirical implications. Proposition 1 and 2, along with their corollaries, not only o¤er an characterization of the optimal job design, but they also have important empirically implications. They highlight how some of the key parameters that de…nes the economic environment, such as the extent of multitasking problem ( ) and the discount rate ( ), may govern the …rm's choice of job design. First and foremost, it is important to note that the relationship between these parameters and the optimal job design depends on the type(s) of incentives (i.e., explicit and/or implicit) that are in place. This is particularly relevant for the comparative statics with respect to . When only implicit incentives are feasible, team accountability is more likely for …rms with higher . In contrast, when both implicit and explicit contracts are in place, team accountability becomes more likely for …rms either with su¢ ciently low or with su¢ ciently high . However, the comparative statics with respect to is relatively simple. For a given , team accountability is more likely when multitasking problem is more severe (i.e., …rms with high ).
It might be di¢ cult to obtain the appropriate empirical measures of and in a given industry. Also, in many cases the job design may be an artifact of the underlying production technology, rather than a choice available to the …rm. However, the results of this model can be put to test in the context of certain industries where these measures are perhaps easier to obtain. The mutual funds industry may be one such candidate. Indeed, as discussed in the introduction of this article, mutual funds often classify themselves as "co-managed" and/or "team managed"funds where a group of employees are jointly responsible for the performance of a set of funds (Massa, 2008) . One may also use a fund's liquidation probability as a measure of (Getmansky et al., 2004) . However, …nding an empirical measure of is more challenging. Information on the types of investments the fund is used for may be indicative of the extend of the multitasking its managers are exposed to. For example, a fund that is primarily invested in government bonds and treasury bills faces lower risks compared to a fund that is entirely invested in the stock market. One may argue that the manager of the latter fund faces a higher multitasking problem because she is not only responsible for increasing the returns of the investment but also have to pay close attention to the risks the fund is bearing.
The key results discussed in this article also shed light on the relative pro…tability of the individual and team-managed funds (Prather and Middleton, 2002; Massa, 2008) . Consider the basic model when all incentives are implicit. Proposition 1 suggests that …rms with higher are more likely to opt for team accountability. In other words, the …rms that adopt team accountability are also the …rms who can o¤er stronger implicit incentives, and therefore, earn higher pro…ts. An empirical investigation of the pro…tability of the individual and team-managed funds that ignores this "endogeneity"issue is likely to overestimate the gains from team accountability.
5.3. Concluding remarks. In many industries, …rms often adopt team accountability even when individual accountability remains a technologically viable option. While incentives in teams is well-studied in the contract theory literature, there has been little research on the endogenous formation of team accountability. Only recently, some authors have argued how team accountability may emerge as the optimal job design in the face of a multitasking problem (Corts, 2007) . This article contributes to this nascent literature on endogenizing team accountability by focusing on a multitasking environment where the …rm relies on implicit contracts (i.e., bonus payments, as is the case, for example, in the mutual fund industry). In the presence of implicit contracts, team accountability involves an interesting trade-o¤: it alleviates the multitasking problem but weakens the implicit incentives. The contribution of this article is to formalize this trade-o¤ and to draw out its implications on the …rms'optimal job design policy.
The key result is that the optimal job design follows a cut-o¤ rule. Only the …rms with high enough reputation concerns (i.e., discount factor) opt for team accountability. The more acute is the multitasking problem the more likely it is that the …rm would opt for team. However, when in addition to implicit contracts, explicit pay-per-performance contracts are also feasible, the cut-o¤ rule stated above is no longer optimal. In such a scenario, …rms with both su¢ ciently high and su¢ ciently low reputation concerns opt for team while …rms with moderate reputation concerns opt for individual accountability.
Overcoming the multitasking problem need not be the only driver of a …rm's job design decision. For example, team accountability may emerge to manipulate career concerns of the agents by obscuring their individual contributions to the project's overall performance (Massa et al., 2008) . Teams may also originate from the need to facilitate cooperation within organization (Shaw and Schneier, 1995) . However, the results highlighted in this article attempt to extend our understanding of how job design interacts with implicit contracts, and how …rms may pro…t from adopting team accountability in a multitasking environment when they must rely implicit incentives. (the IC T B is obtained from IC T A by substituting A1 by B2 , A2 by B1 , e 1 by e 3 and e 4 by e 2 ). Given this, by following the same steps as in Section 3, one obtains the …rms'optimal pro…t functions.
Under individual accountability, the …rm's optimal pro…t function is as follows. For < 1= , I (r) = where r 1 = ( +2 + 2 1=2 )=(2(2 + )) and = 2 ( + 1) 2 + 2 + 1 =(1+ ). In both cases, T (r) is a continuous and decreasing function of r. The reminder of the proof is given in the following steps.
Step 1. We …rst show that for 1= , I (r) T (r). Note that > 1= implies that (1 + )= (1 ) > 2 + 2 + 1 = 2 , which is equivalent to < 2 . Thus one has to compare I (r) as given in (16) with T (r) as given in (17) . For r > =2, I (r) = T (r). For r =2, T (r) 2 , since T (r) is decreasing in r and T ( =2) = 2 . Thus, for r =2, T (r) 2 = I (r).
Step 2. We next show that for < 1= , T (r) and I (r) must intersect at a unique point for r 2 [0; maxf ; g]. First note that when < 1= , T (0) = 2 2 =( + 1) > 2 ( + 1) = I (0). Also note that when < 1= , < , implying that < . Thus, I ( ) > 0 = T ( ). So, by Mean Value Theorem, there must exist a value of r 2 [0; ], say b r, such that T (b r) = I (b r). Furthermore, independent of whether < 2 or > 2 , when < 1= , T ( =2) < I ( =2). Hence, b r 2 (0; =2). In (0; =2), I (r) is constant and T (r) is either constant or decreasing. Moreover, 8 r 2 (0; =2) such that @ T (r)=@r = 0, T (r) 6 = T (r). Thus, T (r) and I (r) intersect only once in (0; =2). Finally, note that @ T (r)=@r @ I (r)=@r 8 r 2 ( =2; ), implying that T (r) and I (r) do not intersect for r 2 ( =2; ).
